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There is something puzzling about statistical evidence. One place this manifests is
in the law, where courts are reluctant to base affirmative verdicts on evidence that is
purely statistical, in spite of the fact that it is perfectly capable of meeting the
standards of proof enshrined in legal doctrine. After surveying some proposed
explanations for this, I shall outline a new approach – one that makes use of a
notion of normalcy that is distinct from the idea of statistical frequency. The puzzle
is not, however, merely a legal one. Our unwillingness to base beliefs on statistical
evidence is by no means limited to the courtroom, and is at odds with almost every
general principle that epistemologists have proposed as to how we ought to manage
our beliefs.
1. Statistical evidence in epistemology and the law
In February 1941, Betty Smith, a resident of Massachusetts, was driving
along a street in the town of Winthrop, when a bus travelling in the
opposite direction forced her to swerve into a parked car. The bus did
not stop, Smith did not get a clear look at either the bus or the driver
and there were no other witnesses. In spite of this paucity of evidence,
Smith brought a civil lawsuit against Rapid Transit Inc. – one of the
companies that operated buses in the town (Smith v Rapid Transit
Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 470, 58 N.E 2d 754, 755 (1945)). According to in-
formation obtained from the department of public utilities, Rapid
Transit Inc. was the only bus company that operated a line on the
street in question and, therefore, the majority of buses travelling along
the street on any given day would be Rapid Transit buses, with the
remainder being private or chartered buses. The trial court ruled
that Rapid Transit Inc. could not be held liable on this basis – a verdict
that was upheld, on appeal, by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts. Flimsy lawsuits that are likely to fail are not uncom-
mon, of course. What is remarkable about this case, though, is that the
prevailing legal doctrine – both then and now, both in the United
States and elsewhere – suggests that it should have succeeded.
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Legal doctrine distinguishes a number of different standards of proof
that courts might apply. The standard of proof that is supposed to be
applied in civil trials is the preponderance of evidence standard – also
known as the ‘balance of probabilities’. As any textbook on evidence
law will attest, this standard is met when a proposition is shown to be
more likely true than false – when its probability, given the evidence,
exceeds 50%.1 Clearly, though, the evidence presented in Smith v
Rapid Transit Inc. does make it more likely true than false that the
bus involved was a Rapid Transit bus. Given that evidence, we would
sooner bet on the bus being a Rapid Transit bus than a bus of another
sort. The standards of proof are more stringent in criminal trials,
where a conviction famously requires that guilt be established
beyond reasonable doubt. But this turn of phrase may also be inter-
preted in terms of a probability threshold – merely one much higher
than 50%.2
Why, then, did the courts find in favour of Rapid Transit Inc. and
not in favour of Smith? If not the preponderance of evidence standard
enshrined in legal doctrine, what standard of proof were these courts
actually applying? In explaining the Supreme Court verdict in Smith v
Rapid Transit Inc., Justice Spalding remarked ‘The most that can be
said of the evidence in the instant case is that perhaps the mathem-
atical chances somewhat favour the proposition that a bus of the de-
fendant caused the accident. This was not enough’. The idea that a
finding of liability cannot rest solely on ‘mathematical’ chances seems
apt – but there is something puzzling about it also. After all, what
other sorts of chances are there?
1 See, for instance, Elliott (1987 chap. 4, section B), Keane (1996 chap. 3, section B) and
Dennis (2002 chap. 11, section F). For some well known commentary on this standard, see the
remarks of Gibbs J and Murphy J in T.N.T Management Pty. Ltd. v Brooks 53 A.L.J.R. 267
(1979) and Lord Brandon in Rhesa Shipping Co. SA v Edmunds and another (The Popi M) 2 All
E.R. 712 (HjL) (1985).
2 See, for instance, Simon (1969), and Simon and Mahan (1971). An early example of this
interpretation is advanced by Bernoulli (1713, part IV, chap. II). In Miller v Minister of Pensions
2 All E.R. 372; 63 T.L.R. 474 KBD (1947) Denning J gave what is sometimes regarded as a
definitive statement of the beyond reasonable doubt standard: ‘[T]he […] degree of cogency
[…] required in a criminal case before an accused is found guilty […] is well settled. It need
not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability […] If the evidence is so
strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed
with the sentence “of course it is possible but not in the least probable” the case is proved but
nothing short of that will suffice’. Denning continued ‘The […] degree of cogency […]
required to discharge a burden in a civil case […] is well settled. It must carry a reasonable
degree of probability, but not so high as is required in a criminal case. If the evidence is such
that the tribunal can say: “We think it more probable than not” the burden is discharged […]’.
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Smith v Rapid Transit Inc. is not the only case in which purely
statistical evidence has been treated with suspicion at trial, in apparent
disregard for legal doctrine. Indeed, it seems generally true that courts
are reluctant to base affirmative verdicts – verdicts of guilt or liability
– on evidence that is purely statistical in nature.3 But Smith v Rapid
Transit Inc. seems a particularly clear counterexample to the legal
doctrine – almost like a case that a philosopher might dream up.
And Smith v Rapid Transit Inc. has served as the inspiration behind
several imaginary cases, such as the well-known Blue-Bus example.
Suppose a bus causes harm on a city street. Suppose there are no
witnesses to the incident, but we have evidence that 90% of the
buses operating in the area, on the day in question, were owned by
the Blue-Bus company. Should a court find the Blue-Bus company
liable for the damage caused? The balance of probabilities would
seem to weigh overwhelmingly in favour of the proposition that
the bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus – indeed, the evidence might
even meet the beyond reasonable doubt standard, if interpreted prob-
abilistically. And yet, it seems that the court should not make any
such finding. To hold the Blue-Bus company liable, purely on the
basis of its large market share, would seem palpably unjust (Kaye
1982, section I; Redmayne 2008; Allensworth 2009, section IIB). But
to judge the Blue-Bus company not liable – which is the only
3 Other cases that are sometimes cited in this regard include Virginia & S.W. Ry. Co. v
Hawk, 160 F 348, 352 (6th Cir. 1908), Evans v Ely, 13 F.2d 62, 64 (3rd Cir, 1926), Sargent v
Massachusetts Accident Co. 307, 246, 250, 29 N.E. 2d 825, 827 (Mass. 1940), Commercial
Standards Insurance Co. v Gordon Transports Inc., 154 F.2d 390, 396 (1946), People v Collins,
438 P.2d 33 40-41 (Cal. 1968), Guenther v Armstrong Rubber Co. 406 F.2d 1315, 1318 (3d Cir.
1969), State v Carlson, 267 N.W. 170, 176 (Minn. 1978), United States v Shonubi, 103, F.3d 1085
(2d Cir. 1997), R v Watters, All ER (D) 1469 (2000). The situation with the case law is not,
however, unequivocal. In Kaminsky v Hertz Corp., 288 N.W. 2d 426 (Mich. Ct. App., 1980),
Hertz was found to be liable for the damage caused by a truck on the grounds that it was
yellow and bore a Hertz logo and that 90% of the yellow trucks bearing Hertz logos are owned
by Hertz. This is sometimes put forward as an example of a case in which purely statistical
evidence was allowed to carry the day (Enoch and Fisher 2015, pp. 561-2).
It may well be that the legal treatment of statistical evidence has not been entirely con-
sistent – but we should be cautious in drawing this lesson from Kaminsky v Hertz Corp. One
thing that has hampered much of the discussion of statistical evidence in legal theory and the
philosophy of law is the lack of any clear criteria for determining when a body of evidence
counts as ‘purely statistical’. It is often assumed that any evidence pertaining explicitly to
frequencies or proportions must be purely statistical in nature, but this cannot in general
be the case. While the evidence put forward in Kaminsky v Hertz Corp does include infor-
mation about a proportion, we should not be too quick to conclude that it is an example of
purely statistical evidence. I shall return to this in n. 19.
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alternative – would now seem to be in flagrant contravention of the
textbook standard.
This mismatch between doctrine and practice seems curious
enough, but there is yet more to find puzzling here. For a court
surely would – and surely should – find the Blue-Bus company
liable on the basis of other kinds of defeasible evidence. Suppose
that, instead of the market share evidence, an eyewitness to the inci-
dent testifies that the bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus. Provided this
testimony is not contradicted or called into question, it would gener-
ally be deemed sufficient for a finding of liability. But eyewitnesses are
fallible. The fact that a witness testifies that the bus involved was a
Blue-Bus bus does not guarantee that it was. The witness might have
suffered an hallucination, or another sort of bus might have been
sporting a Blue-Bus logo, or the witness might have been simply
lying in order to smear the company, and so on. If we were
forced to come up with some numerical estimate of how likely it is
that the bus really was a Blue-Bus bus, given the witness testimony, it’s
doubtful that we would go quite as high as 90% – that would
seem overly trusting. But 90% is, of course, precisely how likely it is
that the bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus, given the statistical evidence
about which we were so apprehensive. A verdict of liability based on
this testimonial evidence would actually run a greater risk of error
than a verdict of liability based upon the statistical evidence.
And yet the former verdict would seem acceptable, while the latter
would not.
Consider also the following example (based on Cohen 1977, §24 and
Nesson 1979). Suppose an electronics store is struck by looters during
a riot. 100 people walk out of the store carrying televisions, while the
transaction record at the cash register indicates that only one televi-
sion was paid for, though no receipt was issued. Suppose Joe is ap-
prehended carrying a television from the store, but we have no other
information about him. Should Joe be prosecuted for theft? Should he
be convicted? Should he be punished? If our only evidence against Joe
is that he carried a television from the store and that 99 out of the 100
televisions carried from the store were stolen, while one was legitim-
ately purchased, then, by launching into such actions against Joe, we
would do him a serious wrong.
Once again, we might contrast this with a case in which the statis-
tical evidence is substituted for eyewitness testimony. Suppose only
one television is stolen and a witness fingers Joe as the culprit. The
testimony of a single eyewitness may not be deemed sufficient for a
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criminal conviction,4 but we might imagine that the testimony is
corroborated by further evidence that comes to light – perhaps the
stolen television is found in Joe’s possession. But even if these two
pieces of evidence were enough to secure a conviction, they wouldn’t
remove all doubt as to Joe’s guilt. There are various possibilities that
we might still imagine: perhaps the witness is lying and the television
was planted in an attempt to frame Joe. Such a turn of events may be
very unlikely, but if we had to make some guess as to the probability of
Joe’s guilt – to come up with some figure – 99% may seem too high.
But this is just how likely Joe’s guilt is made by the statistical evidence
available in the first case. In one sense, the statistical evidence is more
probative – more indicative of Joe’s guilt. And yet it would be less
acceptable – far less acceptable – to base a finding of guilt upon it.5
Why should this be?
This is a puzzle in evidence law. But an epistemological puzzle lies in
the near vicinity. Not only would it be wrong for a court to condemn
Joe purely on the basis of the statistical evidence against him, it would
be wrong for an epistemic subject to do so. Suppose I’m not involved in
any criminal proceedings against Joe, but I simply start asserting that
he is a thief and a looter – in the presence of his family, his friends, his
employer, and so on – all the while my only evidence against him
being that he carried a television from the store and that 99 out of the
100 televisions carried from the store were stolen. In their own way,
such actions are no less unjust than a criminal conviction would be.
And even if I merely believed that Joe committed theft without ever
acting upon this belief or even voicing it, still I do him an injustice,
albeit one of which he’ll remain forever oblivious. Perhaps I could
justifiably believe that Joe is very likely to have committed theft – but
to conclude that he has done so is a further step that I’m just not
entitled to take.
4 Whether a single piece of eyewitness testimony is capable of meeting the criminal stand-
ard of proof is a question generally left, in any given case, to the discretion of judges and
juries. In Scots law, the so called ‘corroboration rule’ explicitly prohibits criminal convictions
based solely on the testimony of a single eyewitness. The rule has long aroused controversy,
and the Scottish government is now committed, on the basis of a 2011 review of Scots law, to
its abolition. The rule continues, at present, to be supported by the majority of Scotland’s
High Court judges and criminal lawyers.
5 One might insist that 99% would actually be a reasonable figure for the probability of
Joe’s guilt, given the testimony and the recovery of the stolen item. Though I do suspect this
would be an overestimate, it’s important to note that nothing essential hinges on this. If needs
be, we can simply strengthen the statistical evidence available in the first case in order to
restore the intended structure of the example.
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If, on the other hand, I spoke to an eyewitness who swears that she
saw Joe stealing a television, then there need be nothing wrong with
my taking this testimony at face value. There need be nothing wrong
with my believing that Joe stole a television and, perhaps, taking cer-
tain consequent actions against him. Consider, then, the two scenarios
before us: in the first I believe that Joe stole a television on the basis of
statistical evidence, while in the second I believe that Joe stole a tele-
vision on the basis of eyewitness testimony. The evidence in the first
scenario makes it more likely that Joe stole a television than does the
evidence in the second scenario; if I were to bet on Joe’s innocence I’d
ask for longer odds in the first scenario than the second. In spite of
this, my belief in the second scenario is more justified than my belief in
the first – indeed, my belief in the first scenario seems not to be
justified at all.
When it comes to the standards of proof that we ought to meet
when forming beliefs, there’s no ‘official doctrine’ that we can refer to.
The closest thing we have are general accounts, proposed by epistem-
ologists, of what it takes for a belief to be justified. But existing ac-
counts of justification tend not to offer much help when it comes to
this puzzle – and, through no accident perhaps, tend to be rather
reminiscent of the standards of proof found in legal doctrine.
Though they differ over the details, many epistemologists agree that
securing justification for believing a proposition is a matter of ensur-
ing that it is sufficiently probable, given one’s evidence.6 Such a view
offers no explanation as to why we would privilege testimonial over
statistical evidence. Both kinds of evidence are equally capable of
making propositions probable.
It may be possible to solve the epistemological puzzle of statistical
evidence in a way that is consistent with a probabilistic approach to
justification. According to the knowledge account of evidence
(Williamson 2000, chap. 9), a proposition P will be part of one’s
body of evidence just in case one knows P. One who accepts this
account, and combines it with a generous epistemology of testimony,
might argue as follows. When an eyewitness tells me that Joe stole a
television I come to know that he did, at which point this proposition
becomes part of my evidence and, thus, certain given that evidence. In
this case, my evidence in the second scenario does make it more likely
6 This view seems to be shared even by epistemologists who otherwise disagree quite pro-
foundly about the nature of justification. (See, for instance, Russell 1948, chap. VI; Chisholm
1957, p. 28; Derksen 1978; Alston 1988; Fumerton 1995, pp. 18-9; Lewis 1996, p. 551; Conee and
Feldman 2004, n. 32; Pryor 2005; BonJour 2010.)
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that Joe stole a television, contrary to the alleged set up of the puzzle.
(See Williamson 2000, section 11.3.)
Intriguingly, this kind of manoeuvre seems to have no real analogue
when it comes to the legal puzzle. The notion of evidence at play in the
legal puzzle is, in effect, a kind of institutional one – whether some-
thing should be considered as evidence at trial is prescribed by explicit
rules.7 I don’t mean to suggest that these rules will settle all difficult
cases, but when it comes to the mechanics of the legal puzzle, the
nature of legal evidence seems not to be one of the moving parts. In
the cases considered, the evidence simply consists of the facts that have
been admitted and are accepted by all parties. While the notion of
evidence at play in the epistemological puzzle is more open-textured,
the present reflections may suggest that it is not, after all, the key to its
resolution.8 In any case, my primary concern here is not with the
epistemological puzzle, but with the legal one.
What the legal puzzle requires for its resolution is a new standard of
proof, unlike anything found in the textbooks or the legal doctrine
more broadly; a standard that demands more than probability, though
less than certainty, that cannot be satisfied by statistical evidence,
though testimonial evidence, and evidence of other kinds, can some-
how meet it. In this paper, I will describe such a standard.9 In the next
7 See, for instance, the Federal Rules of Evidence for the US Federal Court system, particu-
larly articles 4 and 6-10 or part 11 of the Criminal Justice Act (2003) for English and Welsh law.
8 I am inclined to think that many epistemological puzzles have legal analogues that are, in
various ways, more tightly constrained. Consequently, enforcing a principle of uniform solu-
tion across the legal and epistemological domains could serve as a certain check on the po-
tential excesses of epistemological theorising. I won’t discuss this methodology further here,
but will briefly employ it once more at the end of §2.
9 Statistical evidence is sometimes taken not only to be insufficient for meeting the stand-
ards of proof in civil and criminal trials, but to be inadmissible – something that the trier of
fact should not even take into consideration. (See Koehler 2002.) I am not attempting to
account for this feature of legal practice here, though what I say may have some relevance for
it. Sometimes when statistical evidence has been deemed inadmissible, this is because the
evidence is thought to have a dubious or questionable basis (State v Sneed 414 P.2d 858
(N.Mex 1966)) – a reason which can often be taken at face value. Other times, though the
evidence is regarded as solid, it is excluded on the grounds that its strength is likely to be
overestimated by the jury (State v Carlson, 267 N.W. 170, 176 (Minn. 1978)). In cases of this
sort, the decision to exclude the statistical evidence in question rests on assumptions about its
‘real’ strength, and questions about its capacity to meet the legal standards of proof are thereby
implicated. Some remarks by Justice Todd in State v Carlson seem, for instance, to cast doubt
on whether statistical evidence may be capable of meeting the beyond reasonable doubt
standard.
In yet other cases, statistical evidence appears to have been excluded on the grounds of
irrelevance – excluded because it allegedly has no bearing on the question of innocence or guilt
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two sections, I will develop my account by contrasting it with some
existing approaches to the puzzle – in particular, a recent proposal due
to Enoch, Fisher and Spectre (2012) that exploits the notion of sensi-
tivity. My primary aim here is to interpret the existing legal practice –
to outline a standard that makes sense of the way in which statistical
evidence is actually treated in the law. Having said this, however, the
standard I put forward may have some revisionary implications – or
may, at the very least, force a stand on certain contentious aspects of
current legal practice. I take up these issues in §4, though without
attempting to arrive at any final judgment about them.
2. Sensitivity
Consider the following familiar case, due to Chisholm (1989, p. 93).
Suppose I’m walking through the countryside and pass a meadow in
which I spot a dog that has been cunningly disguised to look like a
sheep. Taken in by the ruse, I come to believe that there is a sheep in
the meadow. My belief seems justified – there does appear to be a
sheep in the meadow and I have no inkling of anything suspicious.
Furthermore, as chance would have it, my belief is true – there really is
a sheep in the meadow, grazing behind a hill, out of view. This was
originally put forward as a Gettier case, showing that knowledge is
more than justified, true belief. I don’t know that there is a sheep in
the meadow even though I justifiably and truly believe that there is.
One observation we might make about this case is that the evidence
for my belief seems disconnected from the fact that makes it true. What
makes me believe that there is a sheep in the meadow is the animal
before my eyes. What makes it true that there is a sheep in the
meadow is the animal behind the hill. Say that a body of evidence E
is sensitive to a proposition P just in case, had P been false, E would
also have been false. Following Lewis (1973), this may be spelled out in
terms of possible worlds: E is false in all of the most similar possible
worlds in which P is false. A belief based upon sensitive evidence
might be described as a sensitive belief.
If there hadn’t been a sheep in the meadow, my evidence would
have been unchanged. It would still have appeared as though there was
(Stephens v State 774 P.2d 60, 64 (Wyo. 1989)). These cases raise a more difficult interpretative
challenge. It may be that some of the resources I deploy in developing a new standard of proof
could offer a possible interpretation of such decisions (though not necessarily a legitimisation
of them) and of the notion of ‘relevance’ at work. I won’t attempt to engage with this in detail
here, but I will say a little more on this topic in n. 12 and n. 18.
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a sheep in the meadow and I would still have believed, now errone-
ously, that there was. My belief that there is a sheep in the meadow is
not sensitive. This pattern can be found in many Gettier cases,
prompting some epistemologists to conjecture that sensitivity may
be a necessary condition for knowledge (Dretske 1971; Nozick 1980,
chap. 3) or that it may have some correlation with knowledge (DeRose
2004). Whatever one makes of these claims, we can agree that sensi-
tivity is, at least, a notable feature for a belief or a piece of evidence to
possess.
According to a recent proposal made by Enoch, Fisher and Spectre
(2012), the notion of sensitivity holds the key to resolving the legal
puzzle of statistical evidence. Suppose a court does find the Blue-Bus
company liable on the grounds that 90% of the buses operating in the
area on the day in question were Blue-Bus buses. This evidence might
make it highly probable that the bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus, but
it could not, it seems, be sensitive to this proposition. If the bus had
not been a Blue-Bus bus, 90% of the buses operating in the area would
still have been Blue-Bus buses and the court would still have found the
Blue-Bus company liable. The most similar possible worlds in which
the bus involved was not a Blue-Bus bus are worlds in which the Blue-
Bus company has the same market share and the court verdict is the
same.
Now suppose that a court finds the Blue-Bus company liable on the
basis of eyewitness testimony. While not as probabilistically strong as
the statistical evidence, this testimonial evidence may be sensitive to
the proposition that the bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus. If the bus
involved had not been a Blue-Bus bus, the eyewitness would not have
said that it was and the court would not have found the Blue-Bus
company liable (or so we are invited to suppose). According to Enoch,
Fisher and Spectre, it is the insensitivity of statistical evidence that
explains our reluctance to base an affirmative legal verdict upon it.
There is something striking about this story, but I suspect that it is
not ultimately correct. While it’s true that the testimonial evidence in
the Blue-Bus case may be sensitive to the proposition that the bus
involved was a Blue-Bus bus, whether it really is sensitive depends on
further features of the case – features that have yet to be spelled out. In
the original description of the case, it was never specified, for instance,
that the witness testimony was truthful. Suppose instead that the wit-
ness testimony was false and that the bus involved belonged to another
company. Perhaps the witness really did hallucinate or really was lying
in order to smear the company, and so on. In this case, the witness
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testimony is clearly not sensitive to the proposition that the bus
involved was a Blue-Bus bus. There is a very similar possible world
– the actual world – in which the bus involved was not a Blue-Bus bus,
even though the witness testified that it was. In spite of this, it would
still be acceptable for a court to find the Blue-Bus company liable.
Such a verdict would not, of course, be correct, and could perhaps be
overturned if further evidence came to light, but this is beside the
point. The court has to base its verdict on whatever evidence is avail-
able and the only evidence that is available is the unchallenged testi-
mony of an eyewitness. Testimonial evidence may be insensitive, but it
can still be acceptable to rest an affirmative verdict upon it.10
In general, evidence can never be sensitive to a false proposition –
and, consequently, the sensitivity account cannot accommodate the
possibility of incorrect, though acceptable, affirmative legal verdicts.
(See Blome-Tillmann 2015, section 6.) In fact, in order to make trouble
for the sensitivity account, we needn’t even imagine that the court
verdict in question is incorrect. Suppose that the bus involved really
was a Blue-Bus bus, and the witness saw it, but, if it hadn’t been a
Blue-Bus bus, she would still have said that it was, due to a private
gripe against the company. That is, suppose that the witness was se-
cretly prepared to lie in order to smear the company, but, as things
turned out, she didn’t have to. A verdict of liability based on this
testimony would be correct and acceptable – and yet the testimony
is insensitive. As these possibilities show, the sensitivity or otherwise of
the testimonial evidence depends on how we fill in further details of
the Blue-Bus case. The acceptability or otherwise of finding the com-
pany liable does not depend on these details, however; it depends only
on the evidence before the court.
10 Enoch, Fisher and Spectre also consider a qualified sensitivity condition of the following
sort: evidence E is sensitive to proposition P just in case, had P been false, E would most
probably have been false – a condition that is taken to be met if and only if E is false in the
majority of the most similar worlds in which P is false (Enoch, Fisher and Spectre, 2012,
p. 204). It’s worth noting that even this qualified sensitivity condition is not satisfied in the
case described. Arguably, no other world is as similar to the actual world as it is to itself.
Consequently, if the bus involved was not a Blue-Bus bus, then the actual world is the only
most similar world in which the bus involved was not a Blue-Bus bus – and it is a world in
which the witness testifies that it was. Further, even if we do allow other worlds to be included
in this set – worlds that differ minutely from the actual world perhaps – there is no reason at
all to think that the witness would do something different at the majority of these worlds. A
similar problem besets Thomson’s attempt to distinguish statistical and testimonial evidence
by using a causal condition, which also goes unsatisfied in cases of the kind described. (See
Thomson 1986.)
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While Enoch, Fisher and Spectre don’t suppose that sensitivity is a
necessary condition on knowledge, as I noted above it was with this
role in mind that the notion was first brought into epistemology. And,
in a way, this should already make us suspicious of the idea that
sensitivity is required in order for an affirmative verdict to be accept-
able. There is a kind of misfire here, for an acceptable affirmative
verdict would seem to be the legal analogue of a justified belief,
rather than a piece of knowledge.11 And sensitivity has little promise
as a necessary condition on justified belief. As noted, insensitivity is
widely regarded as being a distinctive feature of at least the first gen-
eration of Gettier cases – and Gettier cases are supposed to be cases of
justified belief. If our final story about knowledge does find some part
for sensitivity, it will be in bridging the gap between justified belief and
knowledge, not the gap between belief and justified belief.
Enoch, Fisher and Spectre do briefly consider cases in which testi-
mony is insensitive because the testifier is lying or mistaken (fn. 23).
They suggest that, although testimonial evidence is not always sensi-
tive, what sets it apart from statistical evidence is that it is sensitive in
the best cases, and this explains why it can be acceptable to base
affirmative verdicts upon it. It may be that Enoch, Fisher and
Spectre could avoid the foregoing problem in this way, but the pro-
posal would need to be developed more fully. If the claim is simply
that testimonial evidence has the potential to be sensitive, while stat-
istical evidence does not, then that claim seems incorrect. For insensi-
tivity is no more an essential feature of statistical evidence than
sensitivity is an essential feature of testimonial evidence.
Consider the Joe case again. Suppose a court did convict Joe of theft
purely on the grounds that he carried a television from the store and
that 99 out of the 100 televisions carried from the store were stolen. Is
this evidence sensitive to the proposition that Joe stole a television?
11 Epistemologists often regard belief as a threefold affair: for any proposition P one can
either believe P, believe P or suspend judgment. Court decisions exhibit the same threefold
structure. An affirmative verdict is the analogue of a belief that the defendant is guilty or liable.
A negative verdict covers the two remaining possibilities; a belief that the defendant is not
guilty or not liable or a suspension of judgment on the issue. This asymmetry between af-
firmative and negative verdicts owes to the way in which the burden of proof is allocated in
civil and criminal trials – to the plaintiff and prosecution, respectively. (See Laudan 2006,
pp. 96-7.) The threefold structure underlying court verdicts is more transparent in Scots law,
which permits a third verdict in criminal trials – a verdict of ‘not proven’ in addition to the
verdicts of ‘guilty ’ and ‘not guilty ’. In California, a defendant found not guilty in a criminal
trial can seek from the judge a ruling of ‘factual innocence’.
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Assume Joe really did steal a television. Assume, further, that he never
set out to acquire a television, but committed an opportunistic crime
when he noticed that the store was being looted. In this case, if Joe had
not stolen a television, he would have simply left the area without one.
If Joe had not stolen a television, the evidence would have been dif-
ferent. Presumably, only 98 out of 99 televisions carried from the store
would have been stolen and, more importantly, Joe would not have
been found carrying a television from the store. That is, if Joe had not
stolen a television, the evidence on which he was convicted would not
have obtained. But these further facts hardly make the court verdict
into an acceptable one. It remains the case that the court never should
have convicted Joe on the grounds that it did. Statistical evidence can
be sensitive, but it is still unacceptable to rest an affirmative verdict
upon it. (For further cases of this type see Blome-Tillmann 2015.)
There are both cases in which testimonial evidence is insensitive,
but it is still acceptable to base an affirmative verdict upon it, and cases
in which statistical evidence is sensitive, but it is still unacceptable to
base an affirmative verdict upon it. What this shows is that neither the
property of sensitivity nor the property of potential sensitivity draws
the line in the right place. As I mentioned, Enoch, Fisher and Spectre’s
notion of ‘sensitivity in the best cases’ may be developed in an alter-
native way that fares better, but I won’t speculate about this further
here.
I will conclude this section with some more general remarks about
the connection between sensitivity and the acceptability of a legal
verdict. Taken together, what the foregoing examples appear to
show is that considerations of sensitivity are not what are ultimately
driving our judgments of acceptability. But the game here is not just
one of comparing predictions with intuitions and noting mismatches.
These mismatches are, I think, indicative of something deeper. I sug-
gested in §1 that an adequate solution to the legal puzzle must provide
a new standard of proof that demands more than probability, but less
than certainty. Sensitivity is a feature of certain pieces of evidence that
does meet these conditions. In a very real sense, though, it is not, and
could not be, a standard of proof.
The Joe case provides a vivid illustration of how questions about the
sensitivity of presented evidence can fail to offer any guidance or
leverage on the primary question of fact that a court is to decide. If
we suppose that Joe is one of the 99 who did steal a television, then, as
discussed, the evidence against him may well be sensitive to his guilt.
If, on the other hand, we suppose that Joe is the one person who
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purchased a television that day, then the evidence would be insensitive
to his guilt. In this case, the most similar possible world in which Joe
does not steal a television is the actual world, and this is a world in
which the statistical evidence holds. In trying to decide whether or not
Joe is guilty it is no use asking whether the presented evidence is
sensitive to his guilt. In effect, the evidence will be sensitive on the
condition that Joe is guilty and it will be insensitive on the condition
that Joe is innocent. We cannot take a view on the sensitivity or
otherwise of the evidence without already taking a view on Joe’s guilt.
Whether the evidence that is presented to a court is sensitive to a
given proposition is not, in general, something that can be discerned
by inspecting the evidence itself: it is determined by further facts that
have not been presented to the court. And yet, these further facts can
have no bearing on what verdict the court should reach. The court
must reach a verdict on the basis of the evidence before it – and the
acceptability or otherwise of the verdict is purely a function of this
evidence.12
Some epistemologists have, of course, advanced ‘externalist’ the-
ories of epistemic justification, on which the justificatory status of a
belief is not wholly determined by the evidence on which it is based,
but may depend on certain external, extra-evidential factors. This may
be an available position in epistemology, but could we take seriously a
corresponding view about the acceptability of legal verdicts? If two
courts were presented with equivalent bodies of evidence against two
individuals charged with equivalent crimes, could it really be accept-
able for them to reach different verdicts – for one individual to be
found guilty and the other innocent – even if there was some variation
in external circumstances? No doubt we can persuade ourselves to say
all manner of things about epistemological thought experiments, but
12 Enoch, Fisher and Spectre put forward the sensitivity condition first and foremost as a
way of distinguishing statistical evidence from testimonial and other kinds of evidence which
may serve as adequate bases for an affirmative verdict. If the preceding examples are on the
right track, the sensitivity condition does not divide up the cases in the right way. Nowhere,
however, do Enoch, Fisher and Spectre suggest that the sensitivity condition should be under-
stood as a standard of proof and they may take it to relate more closely to the issue of
admissibility than proof (Enoch, Fisher and Spectre 2012, section V(B)). For what it’s worth,
I think that standards of admissibility must be transparent in just the same way as standards of
proof. Much as a jury in a criminal trial has to reach its verdict based on the presented
evidence, so too does a judge at a pre-trial hearing have to make an admissibility decision
based on the presented evidence. It is also important to note that, if our focus is not on
sensitivity itself but on potential sensitivity or sensitivity in the best cases, then these may be
properties that can be discerned by inspecting a piece of evidence, though this will depend on
precisely how these notions are spelled out.
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there seems to be something almost viscerally bad about such a turn of
events.13
3. Normic support
Some philosophers have claimed that, alongside standard Gettier
cases, lottery cases provide further counterexamples to the analysis
of knowledge as justified, true belief. (See Hawthorne 2003, p. 9;
Pritchard 2007, p. 4.) Suppose I hold a single ticket – ticket #72 say
– in a fair lottery of 100 tickets with a single guaranteed winner.
Suppose that the lottery has been drawn, my ticket is not the
winner, but I’m yet to hear the result. Suppose that, in spite of this,
I’m convinced that ticket #72 is not the winner, purely on the basis of
the odds involved. Surely I don’t know that ticket #72 has lost, even
though this happens to be true. Presumably, though, my belief that
ticket #72 has lost is justified. After all, the belief is based on some very
strong evidence – evidence that makes it 99% likely to be true. Here,
then, is another kind of example of a justified, true belief that falls
short of knowledge.
This reasoning can seem compelling, but these cases have a very
different ‘feel’ to standard Gettier cases. Think again of Chisholm’s
sheep case. I noted, in discussing this case, that the evidence on which
I believe that there’s a sheep in the meadow seems disconnected from
the fact that makes the belief true. But this is not a criticism of the
evidence per se. Rather, it seems to indicate a problem with the cir-
cumstances in which I find myself. If the circumstances had been more
obliging – if the animal before me really had been a sheep rather than a
disguised dog – then this evidence would have been sufficient for me
to know that there is a sheep in the meadow. In the lottery case,
though, it’s difficult to see how the external circumstances could
have been any more obliging than they already are. Things pan out
much as expected: the lottery is drawn, everything is fair and above
board, ticket #72 does indeed lose, and so on. It seems that I could
never know that ticket #72 has lost purely on the grounds that there are
13 Such a pattern of verdicts would, arguably, violate the principle of precedent – founda-
tional to common law systems – according to which judges are bound by previous decisions
on questions of law. It is generally true that common law systems place great emphasis on
deciding cases in such a way as to ensure that similar bodies of evidence lead to consistent and
predictable outcomes. This kind of consideration does, I’m inclined to think, apply in epis-
temology as well (though there it is much less stark).
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100 tickets in the lottery and only one winner, irrespective of what the
external circumstances are like.
In the lottery case, the failure of my belief to qualify as knowledge
really must be due to some shortcoming of my evidence, which im-
mediately calls into question the supposition that this belief is justi-
fied. We know that there is no question about the probabilistic strength
of the evidence I possess, so what could the problem be? An observa-
tion by Jonathan Vogel may provide a clue: ‘[…] although winning a
lottery on a particular ticket is unlikely or improbable, it would not be
abnormal in some intuitive sense, for the ticket one holds to turn out
to be a winner’ (Vogel 1990, p. 16, emphasis in the original). In some
sense, there would be nothing abnormal about ticket #72 winning the
lottery, despite the odds against it. After all, some ticket has to win,
and it might just as well be ticket #72 as any other. If I believe that
ticket #72 has lost the lottery based just on the odds involved, then my
belief could turn out to be false without anything abnormal having
transpired. In contrast, if there appears to be a sheep in the meadow,
but there isn’t one, then there must be something abnormal happen-
ing. If I believe that there is a sheep in the meadow, based on the
appearance of a sheep in the meadow, then only some kind of abnor-
mal circumstance could part my belief from the truth.
This is a genuine disanalogy between the evidence available in the
lottery case and the evidence available in the sheep case, but what is
this notion of normalcy that is being appealed to? One attractive
thought is that normalcy is just a statistical notion: normal circum-
stances are circumstances that frequently obtain while abnormal cir-
cumstances are circumstances that infrequently obtain. Perhaps we do
use the words ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ in this way on occasion. But
this seems not to capture Vogel’s notion of abnormality. After all, the
situation in which ticket #72 wins a 100 ticket lottery is, presumably,
infrequent.
Another attractive thought is that abnormal circumstances require
more explanation than normal circumstances do. This may be more
helpful in the present case. If ticket #72 really did win the lottery in
spite of the odds, then, while I may be surprised and delighted, I
wouldn’t try to find some special explanation for how this could
possibly have occurred. It could ‘just so happen’ that ticket #72 is
the winning ticket and there’s no more to be said on the matter. If,
on the other hand, there was no sheep in the meadow, in spite of the
fact that there appeared to be a sheep in the meadow, then there really
would have to be some special explanation for how this came about.
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Perhaps I’m looking at a dog disguised as a sheep, or I’m taken in by
some strange trick of the light, or I’m hallucinating, and so on.
Whatever the truth, there is more to be said.
Say, at a first pass, that a body of evidence E normically supports a
proposition P just in case the circumstance in which E is true and P is
false would be less normal, in the sense of requiring more explanation,
than the circumstance in which E and P are both true (Smith 2010, 2016).
Given that there appears to be a sheep in the meadow, the situation in
which there is no sheep in the meadow requires more explanation than
the situation in which there is a sheep in the meadow. The appearance of
a sheep in the meadow normically supports the proposition that there is
a sheep in the meadow. Given that there are 100 tickets in the lottery and
only one winner, the situation in which ticket #72 is the winner requires
no more explanation than the situation in which ticket #45 is the winner
or the situation in which ticket #12 is the winner, and so on. The fact that
there are 100 tickets in the lottery and only one winner does not normi-
cally support the proposition that ticket #72 has lost.
We can draw a similar contrast between the two kinds of evidence at
play in the Blue-Bus example. Given that an eyewitness testified that
the bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus, if it turned out that the bus
involved was not a Blue-Bus bus, then there would have to be some
accompanying explanation. Possible explanations have already been
floated: perhaps the witness was hallucinating, or a bus owned by
another company was sporting a Blue-Bus logo, or the witness con-
cocted a story to smear the company, and so on. It can’t ‘just so
happen’ that the testimony was wrong. But it could just so happen
that the bus involved was not a Blue-Bus bus in spite of the fact that
90% of the buses operating in the area on the day in question were
Blue-Bus buses. While this might in a sense be surprising, given the
proportions involved, it clearly wouldn’t demand any kind of further
explanation.
Given the statistical evidence, it would frequently be the case that the
bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus. Given the testimonial evidence it
would normally be the case that the bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus.
The testimonial evidence normically supports this proposition, while
the statistical evidence does not. Furthermore, the testimonial evi-
dence normically supports this proposition irrespective of how we
fill in the external facts and details of the case.14 It makes no difference,
14 If, however, there was additional evidence available in this case, then the conclusion that
the bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus may no longer be normically supported. Normic support
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for instance, whether the bus involved really was a Blue-Bus bus or a
bus of another kind. What is important is that the bus could not have
been a bus of another kind without there being some associated
explanation.
Similar remarks apply to the Joe case. In one scenario, an eyewitness
claims that she saw Joe stealing the television and the television is
found in Joe’s possession. If it still turns out that Joe is innocent of
this crime, then explanation is needed. In the other scenario, what we
have is the information that Joe carried a television from the store and
that 99 of the 100 televisions carried from the store were stolen. This
evidence does make it very likely that Joe is guilty, but if we choose to
wield it against Joe we effectively know, from the outset, that he could
simply be the one innocent person and that’s that. The former body of
evidence normically supports the proposition that Joe stole a televi-
sion, while the latter body of evidence does not.
Once again, these claims are independent of any further details of
the case that are yet to be specified. Whether Joe is guilty, whether Joe
is innocent, the statistical evidence leaves it open that he be innocent
without any special explanation being required. The question of
whether the statistical evidence normically supports Joe’s guilt can
perfectly well be answered without our taking any prior view on
Joe’s guilt. It is straightforwardly answered in the negative.
In the cases considered, our judgments about the presence or ab-
sence of normic support track our judgments about whether an af-
firmative legal verdict would be acceptable or unacceptable. What I
suggest is a standard of proof that is met only if a proposition is
normically supported by the evidence – only if the evidence makes
the falsity of that proposition less normal, in the sense of calling for
is defeasible – just because a given body of evidence normically supports a proposition, it does
not automatically follow that an expanded or enriched body of evidence will continue to do
so. If the witness admits, under cross examination, that she is prone to colour hallucinations,
then the normic support for the proposition that the bus involved was a Blue-Bus bus would
be defeated. Given the expanded body of evidence, the falsity of this proposition would no
longer require more explanation that its truth. More plausibly, if we learned that the witness
had changed her initial story, or if another witness took the stand and denied that the bus was
a Blue-Bus bus, then this would arguably have the same effect. I give a more detailed discus-
sion of the defeasibility of normic support in Smith (2016) particularly sections 4.3 and 7.2.
In some cases, there may be a kind of ‘standing defeater’ for testimony offered in court.
This may be so, for instance, in the case of testimony that a defendant offers on his own
behalf, or testimony offered by an eyewitness with an obvious interest in fabricating a story so
as to avoid incrimination. In any case with this structure, the standing defeater would itself
need to be defeated or neutralised before the testimony would supply normic support for its
content. I won’t pursue these issues further here.
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more explanation, than its truth. What I suggest is that a verdict of
guilt or liability is only acceptable in so far as this normic standard is
met. This is my proposed solution to the legal puzzle of statistical
evidence.15
A few points of clarification: first, the proposed normic standard is
not meant to be applied to each individual item of evidence presented
in a trial but, like the probabilistic standards found in legal doctrine, is
to be applied to the total evidence presented. Second, the normic
standard is being proposed only as a necessary condition for the ac-
ceptability of an affirmative verdict. It is compatible with the proposal
that a normically supportive body of evidence be deemed insufficient
for an affirmative verdict. Third, and relatedly, the normic standard is
not being put forward as an alternative to probabilistic standards of
proof, but can exist alongside such standards. If we imagine a legal
system that really did operate with purely probabilistic standards of
proof – with, say, one threshold for civil trials and a higher threshold
for criminal trials – then a normic standard could be introduced while
leaving the existing probabilistic standards in place. This would never
make verdicts of guilt or liability any easier to secure. Rather, it would
place further limits on such verdicts – and would do so, or so it is
hoped, in such a way as to bring the imagined system closer to our
own.
As this discussion illustrates, the existence of a normic standard for
civil and criminal trials is still compatible with the overall standards of
proof being higher in criminal trials. One way to achieve this is to
15 To give a corresponding solution to the epistemic puzzle of statistical evidence we would
need to accept a normic standard for justified belief – a view on which one only has justifi-
cation to believe a proposition if it is normically supported by one’s evidence. While I am
inclined to accept this view, it does raise a number of issues which I haven’t attempted to
address here. The idea that we cannot justifiably believe, on the basis of the odds involved, that
a single ticket has lost a fair lottery is non-standard, though it has been defended, often as a
response to the lottery paradox. (See, for instance, Ryan 1996, Nelkin 2000, Smithies 2012 and
Littlejohn 2012.)
Further, in Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne famously argues that many of the
things we ordinarily believe, particularly about the future, entail propositions about lottery
outcomes. If, for instance, I believe that I won’t be able to afford an African safari holiday next
year, this entails that I’m not about to win a large cash prize in the lottery. If I lack justifi-
cation for believing the latter, as the normic view would seem to imply, and justification is
closed under single premise deductive consequence, then I must lack justification for believing
the former – a concession which might seem to invite a more general sceptical threat. I think
that the normic view has the resources to meet this threat (Smith 2016, section 3.2), but I
won’t attempt to engage with this issue here. In any case, this problem does not appear to
beset the normic solution to the legal puzzle of statistical evidence – at least not in the same
form.
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conjoin a normic standard with a more demanding probabilistic
standard for criminal trials and a less demanding probabilistic stand-
ard for civil trials. It is worth noting, however, that the notion of
normic support may enable a more radical departure from the stand-
ard conception of legal standards of proof. The above definition of
normic support is naturally extended to comparisons: say that a body
of evidence E1 normically supports a proposition P more strongly than
a body of evidence E2 just in case the circumstance in which E1 is true
and P is false is less normal, in the sense of requiring more explan-
ation, than the circumstance in which E2 is true and P is false. While I
won’t attempt to develop such an account here, it may be possible to
make sense of different standards of proof, of varying strength, from
within a purely normic framework without any appeal to probabilistic
standards whatsoever.16
4. Some difficulties: the case of DNA evidence
I have put forward a normic standard of proof as a way of interpreting
what would otherwise be a puzzling feature of our legal practice –
namely, the legal preference for testimonial over statistical evidence. If
we accept that normic support is also a necessary condition for or-
dinary justified belief, it may go some way towards rationalising this
preference: testimonial evidence can give rise to justified belief while
16 I’ve considered a number of cases in which evidence provides strong probabilistic sup-
port for liability or guilt but no normic support, and used such cases to argue against purely
probabilistic standards of proof, but cases of the reverse sort are also possible – and might
weigh against the idea of purely normic standards of proof. It is possible for a body of evidence
E to provide normic support for a proposition P, whilst providing only weak probabilistic
support. One way in which this can occur is if the falsity of P, given E, would require more
explanation that its truth, but there are numerous independent factors that could potentially
explain falsity, and a significant likelihood that some such factor obtains, though none has been
identified. In this case, the probability of P, given E, may be relatively low, even though P is
normically supported by E.
This is not merely an abstract possibility. There are cases of eyewitness testimony that
arguably fit this pattern. Much of the psychological research on the reliability of eyewitnesses
has served to highlight the sheer range of factors that can potentially interfere with the ac-
curate reporting of a witnessed event (Loftus 1996). There may well be circumstances in which
some kind of interference with a piece of eyewitness testimony should be regarded as signifi-
cantly likely, although no evidence of actual interference has been presented. In such circum-
stances, it would seem highly questionable to base a criminal conviction on the testimony in
question – which speaks in favour of operating with probabilistic as well as normic standards
of proof. It may be that such convictions could also be blocked by utilising stronger normic
standards of proof, but I won’t pursue this here.
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statistical evidence cannot.17 For all I have said, though, it may be that
the normic standard clashes with other aspects of our legal practice.
Even if eyewitness testimony is capable of meeting the normic stand-
ard, it may be that other kinds of evidence routinely appealed to in
civil and criminal trials – and sometimes treated as a sufficient basis
for an affirmative verdict – cannot.
At first glance, the remarks that I’ve made about testimonial evi-
dence would seem to apply to many other categories of incriminating
evidence. Suppose we have, say, photographs or video footage that
appear to show a defendant in the act of committing a crime, or a
defendant is shown to have lied about his whereabouts at the time a
crime took place, or we have a signed confession. These kinds of
evidence clearly do more than simply ‘stack the odds’ in favour of
guilt. In the event that a defendant is innocent, the existence of such
evidence would demand special explanation.
There will be more difficult cases, though. I will focus here on one:
DNA evidence. Suppose a DNA sample is lifted from a crime scene and
identified as belonging to the perpetrator. When run against a database
the sample yields a ‘cold hit’ – a matching DNA profile belonging to
some member of the population, with no other known connection to
the crime. Suppose this individual is arrested and charged with the
crime. Suppose that no further evidence against the individual emerges,
but an expert witness testifies that the chance of two individuals in the
population sharing the same profile is exceedingly slim. Should the
individual be convicted of the crime, just on the basis of the DNA
match? Whatever our feeling about this, it seems that a conviction in
a case like this may violate a normic standard. While it may be very
unlikely that there is another person in the population who matches the
profile, and is the source of the sample at the crime scene, this would
not, or not obviously, be a circumstance requiring special explanation.
To put it differently, the individual in this case may be innocent and his
profile match the sample as a result of sheer chance.
A few points are immediately worth making. First, most uses of
DNA evidence in criminal prosecution are, at present, not like the
17 It’s plausible to think that it could not be acceptable to base a verdict of guilt or liability on
evidence that would be insufficient to ground justified belief in guilt or liability. (See, for instance,
Ho 2008, chap. 3.) However, Enoch, Fisher and Spectre argue that the law should not care about
epistemological niceties such as knowledge or justified belief – at least not as ends in themselves
(Enoch, Fisher and Spectre 2012, section V). I won’t pursue this topic here, but, suffice it to say, if
Enoch, Fisher and Spectre are correct, then the normic standard may offer only an interpretation of
the legal practice, and one that effectively leaves questions about its legitimacy open.
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case described. DNA evidence often takes the form of a match between
a crime scene sample and the profile of a person upon whom suspi-
cion has already fallen for independent reasons, such as eyewitness
testimony. These ‘confirmatory ’ uses of DNA evidence may often
result in successful conviction, and a normic standard is in no conflict
with this – for the standard could easily be met by the total evidence
presented. And if, as suggested above, we understand ‘beyond reason-
able doubt’ to incorporate both a normic and a probabilistic standard,
then the DNA evidence may even play a pivotal role in ensuring that a
conviction is acceptable.18
Similar remarks apply to cases in which a suspect, initially identified
via a cold hit, is subsequently linked to a crime in independent ways.
In these cases, too, conviction may be consistent with a normic stand-
ard. But there are real cases that come closer to the above description –
cases in which a conviction has been secured based on nothing more,
or little more, than a DNA cold hit.19 Further, there is some indication
18 Given a mixed normic/probabilistic standard of proof, we would expect DNA evidence
to be deemed relevant and admissible in criminal trials, consistent with the actual practice, but
would face a residual puzzle of explaining why statistical evidence of other kinds is often
deemed to be inadmissible. In contrast, a pure normic standard of proof, of the kind suggested
at the end of §3, would serve to raise doubts about the relevance and admissibility of (nor-
mically inert) statistical evidence, but such doubts would appear to extend to DNA evidence as
well. As I mentioned in n.9, admissibility is not my primary concern here. But I hope to
pursue these questions elsewhere.
19 See, for instance, State v Toomes, 191 S.W.3d 122, 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005), State v
Hunter, 861 N. E.2d 898, 901 (Ohio Ct. App., 2006), and People v Puckett, No. A121368 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009)). Cold hit DNA convictions are sometimes presented as an exception to courts’
general reluctance to rely on purely statistical evidence. The claim that DNA evidence is just a
kind of statistical evidence seems widely accepted (see, for instance, Roth 2010, Enoch and
Fisher 2015, part III) though it is seldom defended in any detail. It is true enough that the
provision of DNA evidence tends to be accompanied by some numerical estimate, from an
expert witness, of the probability of error. But it doesn’t follow from this alone that the
evidence is purely statistical in nature. After all, any sort of evidence – testimony included
– could in principle be accompanied by a probability estimate from an expert. Even if a piece
of eyewitness testimony came with an attached probability value based on extensive research
into the reliability of eyewitnesses, that would not make it into purely statistical evidence. The
normic support that the testimony provides for its content is not lost simply because prob-
ability has been allowed to enter the picture.
While I think it may ultimately be correct to categorise DNA evidence as statistical, there
may be other cases in which the salience of probability estimates has led to evidence being
mischaracterised. In n.3 I mentioned a well-known case – Kaminsky v Hertz Corp. – in which a
finding of liability was, allegedly, based on evidence that is purely statistical. In this case, once
again, the evidence presented had a very clear probability attached, and the supposition that
the evidence was purely statistical seems based on nothing more than this. Arguably, though,
the fact that a truck bears a Hertz logo does provide normic support for the proposition that it
is owned by Hertz – normic support which is not diminished by learning of the precise
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that such ‘pure cold hit’ convictions will become increasingly
common, driven partly by improvements in DNA recovery techniques
and by the massive expansion of offender databases.20 (See Roth 2010,
section IB, section II.) This practice remains controversial amongst
legal theorists, however (see Semikhodskii 2007, Roth 2010), and there
are also examples of cold hit DNA prosecutions that have resulted in
acquittals or reversals on appeal.
A normic standard of proof would block pure cold hit DNA convic-
tions. If an individual is innocent of a crime, and is not the source of a
DNA sample found at a crime scene, there may be an explanation as to
why it matched his profile in a database – for example, the sample was
compromised, the test results were tampered with, someone was trying
to frame him, and so on – but, equally, there may not be. Even if nothing
like this has taken place, the individual may still be innocent, and the
match a result of sheer chance.21 This is one respect in which pure cold
hit DNA convictions depart from pre-existing legal practice.
None of this is to say that cold hit DNA convictions are illegitimate.
The clash with the normic standard could be portrayed as a reason for
being critical of such convictions, but could also be seen as a reason
for resisting the standard and seeking an alternative solution to the
legal puzzle of statistical evidence. I have argued that Enoch, Fisher
and Spectre’s sensitivity-based solution to the puzzle is not effective.
But it is instructive to note that it does appear to offer a different
verdict on pure cold hit DNA evidence (Enoch and Fisher 2015, part
III). If an individual identified via a cold hit really is the source of a
DNA sample found at a crime scene, then, had he not committed the
frequency with which this is borne out. In this case, the presented evidence would meet a
normic standard of proof. Some suggestive commentary in Kaminsky v Hertz Corp. suggests
that the evidence was not taken to be purely probabilistic: ‘We find […] that the Hertz color
scheme and logo establish a prima facie showing of ownership or control […] The named firm
may introduce evidence indicating lack of control or ownership. But such explanations are for
the jury to evaluate and appraise in light of all the surrounding circumstances’. The ‘descrip-
tive’ question of what it means for evidence to be purely statistical and the ‘normative’
question of what it takes for evidence to support an acceptable affirmative verdict cannot
be completely disentangled from one another.
20 There are political reasons also. In the United States, local authorities have received large
federal grants to expand the use of DNA evidence in resolving backlogged cases. See National
Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009).
21 Cases in which a match results from laboratory error or tampering or interference of
some other kind are sometimes referred to as ‘false’ matches. While a cold hit DNA conviction
may be wrongful as a result of a false match, the crucial point is that the conviction may be
wrongful even if the match is ‘true’.
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crime, there would have been no cold hit. The evidence is sensitive to
his guilt.22
In so far as the normic standard is supported by its capacity to make
sense of certain aspects of legal practice, the fact that it conflicts with
other aspects, even contentious ones, can carry only limited weight
against them. One potential way to take the argument against cold hit
DNA convictions further would be to offer a principled reason as to why
the law should care about normic support – about ensuring that con-
victions are normically supported. If it could be shown that a normic
standard is important for the overarching aims or purposes of the legal
system, then this could increase the pressure on such convictions. Enoch,
Fisher and Spectre do provide a principled account of why the law
should care about sensitivity and, in that respect, my theory is less com-
plete than theirs.23 I won’t attempt to pursue this here, however.
Legal adjudication is one setting in which we are made acutely
aware of our own uncertainty – and the notion of probability offers
us a powerful way in which our uncertainty can be quantified and
made more tractable. Perhaps it is understandable, in this setting, that
we should always try to view our uncertainty through this lens – to
take the significance of evidence to be exhausted by its probabilistic
significance. As some commentators on the legal puzzle of statistical
evidence have claimed, ‘[A]ll factual evidence is ultimately “statistical”
and all legal proof ultimately “probabilistic”’ (Tribe 1971, p. 1330, n.2,
emphasis in the original) and ‘[A]ll information is probability
22 Naturally, if the individual in question is not the source of the DNA at the crime scene,
and the match is a false one or a coincidentally true one, the evidence will not be sensitive to
his guilt. This is another instance in which the sensitivity or insensitivity of the evidence hinges
upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
23 Enoch, Fisher and Spectre’s account appeals to the aim of deterring criminal or negligent
behaviour, which undoubtedly has a strong claim to being one of the aims of the legal system.
Put roughly, if courts were willing to base affirmative verdicts on insensitive evidence, then,
according to Enoch Fisher and Spectre, this might lead people to reason that they could be
convicted or found liable irrespective of what they do – thus removing an important incentive
for responsible or law abiding behaviour. If, for instance, courts were prepared to find the
Blue-Bus company liable for any bus related incident, purely in virtue of its large market share,
then that could make rival companies, and perhaps even the Blue-Bus company itself, less
inclined to take proper precautions, maintain high safety standards, and so on. It may be that
a willingness to base affirmative verdicts on statistical evidence would have the adverse con-
sequences that Enoch, Fisher and Spectre suggest – but, once again, I doubt that the insensi-
tivity of such evidence could adequately explain this. After all, courts already do base
affirmative verdicts on evidence that is insensitive. This is just a consequence of the fact
that courts sometimes arrive at affirmative verdicts that are incorrect. This doesn’t dampen
the capacity of the legal system to deter crime – or, if it does, then it does so unavoidably. I
won’t pursue this criticism here.
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information’ (Saks and Kidd 1980-81, p. 153). And yet there is nothing
God-given about the notion of probability. When it comes to mana-
ging our uncertainty, all that we have are a number of human con-
trivances, better and worse suited to different purposes. If we are open,
from the outset, to a range of different ways of managing uncertainty,
the legal puzzle of statistical evidence need not strike us as a ‘puzzle’ at
all. It is this perspective that I’ve argued for here.24
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